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I. INTRODUCTION 
Tiffany Parker’s trial started and ended with Facebook. On December 2, 
2011, Parker fought with Sheniya Brown over Facebook messages regarding a 
mutual love interest.1 Later that night, Parker allegedly posted entries on her 
Facebook page containing content such as “bet tht [sic] bitch didnt [sic] think [I] 
was going to see her ass . . . bet she wont [sic] inbox me no more, 
#caughtthatbitch.”2 After the jury rejected Parker’s claim of self-defense and 
convicted her of second-degree assault, the sole basis for her appeal was that the 
prosecution failed to properly authenticate the Facebook entries as ones she had 
authored.3 
In addressing the issue, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that courts 
have applied two conflicting approaches regarding the authentication of social 
media evidence. Most courts apply a traditional authentication standard based 
on the assumption “that the risk of forgery exists with any evidence.”4 Other 
courts, however, impose a higher authentication bar based on forgery concerns 
unique to social media evidence.5 This Essay argues against the majority 
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1.  Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 683 (Del. 2014).  
2.  Id. at 684. 
3.  Id.  
4.  Id. at 686.  
5.  Id.  
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approach and in favor of a more stringent authentication standard for social 
media evidence.  
II. AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK 
Before a party can introduce evidence, it must first provide some indication 
that the evidence is what the party claims it to be, i.e., it must authenticate the 
evidence. For example, a prosecutor seeking to introduce a confession note 
allegedly written by the defendant must first present evidence that the defendant 
in fact wrote the letter. According to Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a), 
To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of 
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.6 
This authentication standard is the same as the conditional relevance 
standard contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b):7 If a reasonable juror 
could find the conditional fact—authentication—by a preponderance of the 
evidence, Rule 901(a) has been satisfied.8 
Rule 901(b), in turn, provides ten nonexhaustive illustrations of how a party 
can authenticate evidence. For example, Rule 901(b)(1) allows for 
authentication through testimony of a witness with knowledge. Under this Rule, 
any witness who saw the defendant write a confession note could authenticate 
the note as one written by the defendant. Meanwhile, Rule 901(b)(2) allows for 
authentication via nonexpert opinion about handwriting, which would allow for 
the defendant’s wife, friend, or co-worker to authenticate a confession note 
based on familiarity with the way that the defendant “dots his i’s and crosses his 
t’s.”9 Furthermore, Rule 901(b)(3) would allow either a handwriting expert (or 
the trier of fact) to compare the confession note with a handwriting exemplar, or 
other writing indisputably written by the defendant, to establish that the same 
person wrote both.10 
In other cases, the proponent can authenticate an exhibit through an 
accumulation of circumstantial evidence under Rule 901(b)(4). This Rule 
permits authentication through “[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal 
patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all 
the circumstances.”11 
 
6.  FED. R. EVID. 901(a). 
7.  See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, 
proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. The court may admit 
the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced later.”).  
8.  See United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that authenticity is a 
question for the jury, and indicating that admissibility is governed by the procedure set forth in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b)). 
9.  See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2) (providing that a person familiar with the handwriting may 
testify that it is genuine, provided that the knowledge was not “acquired for the current litigation”). 
10.  See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3) (providing that “an authenticated specimen” may be used for 
comparison by an expert witness or the trier of fact). 
11.  FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).  
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For example, in Hislop v. State,12 the prosecution used the following 
circumstantial evidence to authenticate a note which allegedly contained the 
defendant’s confession to murdering his mother: (1) an officer found the note in 
the home shared by the defendant and his mother; (2) the note was underneath a 
billfold beside the couch on which the defendant was lying; (3) the billfold 
contained a second note in which the defendant asked his veterinarian to take 
care of his cat; and (4) the defendant’s neighbor and paramedic both testified 
that the defendant confessed to stabbing his mother.13 According to the Court of 
Appeals of Texas, “this combination of factors serve[d] to provide an adequate 
level of authentication to meet the initial criteria of Rule 901 and provide[d] the 
necessary condition precedent to admissibility.”14 
III. SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE 
According to the Delaware Supreme Court in Parker v. State,15 “[s]ocial 
media has been defined as ‘forms of electronic communications . . . through 
which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal 
messages, and other content.’”16 On social media sites such as Facebook and 
Twitter, a user can create a personal profile and post content, including text, 
pictures, and videos, which are available to Internet users at large and delivered 
to the author’s subscribers.17 
Attorneys are increasingly introducing social media evidence as exhibits at 
trial. For example, eighty-one percent of American Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers indicated in response to a survey that “they have seen an increase in the 
number of cases using social networking evidence during the past five years,”18 
with such evidence being used in an estimated ninety percent of divorce cases.19 
As a result, “[t]he authentication of social media evidence has become a 
prevalent issue in litigation today, creating much confusion and disarray for 
attorneys and judges.”20 
 
12.  64 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. App. 2001). 
13.  Hislop, 64 S.W.3d at 545–46.  
14.  Id. at 546.  
15.  85 A.3d 682 (Del. 2014). 
16.  Parker, 85 A.3d at 685 (quoting Honorable Paul W. Grimm et al., Authentication of Social 
Media Evidence, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 434 (2013)) (omission in original). 
17.  Id. 
18. Press Release, Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law, Big Surge in Social Networking Evidence Says 
Survey of Nation’s Top Divorce Lawyers (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.aaml.org/about-the-
academy/press/press-releases/e-discovery/big-surge-social-networking-evidence-says-survey-. 
19. Janie Porter, Facebook Used in 90 Percent of Divorce Cases, WTSP NEWS, 
http://www.wtsp.com/news/article/189649/8/Facebook-used-in-90-percent-of-divorce-cases (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2014) (supporting that estimation with anecdotal evidence).  
20.  Grimm, supra note 16, at 433.  
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IV. THE AUTHENTICATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE 
A. The Business as Usual Approach 
Confronted with social media evidence, most courts have applied the 
traditional approach to authentication, typically relying on Rule 901(b)(4). For 
instance, in Tienda v. State,21 Ronnie Tienda, Jr. was charged with murdering 
David Valadez.22 At trial, the prosecution introduced messages such as “I live to 
stay fresh!! I kill to stay rich!!” from three MySpace pages allegedly created by 
Tienda.23 The trial court found that the prosecution properly authenticated this 
evidence under Rule 901(b)(4).24 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals later 
agreed, concluding that “the internal content of the MySpace postings—
photographs, comments, and music—was sufficient circumstantial evidence to 
establish a prima facie case such that a reasonable juror could have found that 
they were created and maintained by the appellant.”25 The court acknowledged 
that Tienda could have been the victim of “malefactors” who created or hacked 
the MySpace pages, “somehow stole the appellant’s numerous self-portrait 
photographs, [and] concocted boastful messages about David Valadez’s murder 
and the circumstances of that shooting.”26 But the court concluded that these 
possibilities merely went to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.27 
Later, in Parker, the Delaware Supreme Court relied on Tienda and Rule 
901(b)(4) to find that the prosecution had properly authenticated Facebook 
entries in which Tiffany Parker allegedly boasted about attacking Sheniya Brown 
earlier in the day.28 According to the court: 
First, the substance of the Facebook post referenced the altercation 
that occurred between Parker and Brown. Although the post does not 
mention Brown by name, it was created on the same day after the 
altercation and referenced a fight with another woman. Second, 
Brown’s testimony provided further authenticating evidence. Brown 
testified that she viewed Parker’s post through a mutual friend. 
Thereafter, Brown “shared” the post and published it on her own 
Facebook page. Collectively, this evidence was sufficient for the trial 
court to find that a reasonable juror could determine that the proffered 
evidence was authentic.29 
 
21.  358 S.W.3d 633, 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
22.  Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 634. 
23.  Id. at 635.  
24.  Id. at 637. 
25.  Id. at 641–42.  
26.  Id. at 645–46.  
27.  Id. at 646; see also State v. Assi, No. 1 CA-CR 10-0900, 2012 WL 3580488 (Ariz. App. 2012) 
(finding that the defendant’s arguments about the authenticity of MySpace evidence went to weight 
and not admissibility). 
28.  85 A.3d 682, 686–87 (Del. 2014) (citing FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4); Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 633).   
29.  Id. at 688.  
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B. The Stricter Approach 
Other courts have raised the authentication bar in cases involving social 
media evidence. In Smith v. State,30 Scott Smith was convicted of capital murder 
in connection with the death of his wife’s seventeen-month-old daughter, Ally.31 
At trial, the prosecution had admitted Facebook messages allegedly authored by 
Smith concerning his problems with his wife and her daughter, such as, “[I] feel 
my temper building and [I] know [I] will hurt someone, they are playing with fire 
and have no clue.”32 The trial court deemed these messages authenticated under 
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4), relying on Smith’s wife’s allegation that 
the page belonged to him, the fact that the Facebook page was created by “Scott 
Smith,” and the fact that it contained a photograph of Smith.33  
The Supreme Court of Mississippi later reversed, finding that “[t]he 
authentication of social media poses unique issues regarding what is required to 
make a prima facie showing that the matter is what the proponent claims.”34 
Specifically, the court observed that “[t]he ease with which defendants and 
alleged victims alike could fabricate a social media account to corroborate a 
story necessitates more than a simple name and photograph to sufficiently link 
the communication to the purported author under Rule 901.”35 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reached a similar conclusion in Griffin v. 
State.36 In Griffin, Antoine Griffin, also known by the nickname “Boozy,” was 
charged with various crimes in connection with the shooting death of Darvell 
Guest.37 At trial, the State sought to prove that the defendant’s girlfriend, Jessica 
Barber, threatened a witness for the prosecution by posting on her MySpace 
page, “FREE BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! 
U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!”38 The trial court found that the prosecution 
properly authenticated the MySpace page, and the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland agreed, finding that Barber’s “photograph, personal information, and 
references to freeing ‘Boozy’” satisfied Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-
901(b)(4).39 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, noting that “[t]he potential for 
fabricating or tampering with electronically stored information on a social 
networking site . . . poses significant challenges from the standpoint of 
authentication of printouts of the site.”40 Specifically, the court concluded that 
[t]he potential for abuse and manipulation of a social networking site 
 
30.  136 So.3d 424 (Miss. 2014). 
31.  Smith, 136 So.3d at 426–27.  
32.  Id. at 430 (alterations in original).  
33.  Id. at 433–35.  
34.  Id. at 432, 435.  
35.  Id. at 433–344.  
36.  19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011).  
37.  Griffin, 19 A.3d at 417–18. 
38.  Id. at 418. 
39.  Id. at 423. 
40.  Id. at 422–424.  
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by someone other than its purported creator and/or user leads to our 
conclusion that a printout of an image from such a site requires a 
greater degree of authentication than merely identifying the date of 
birth of the creator and her visage in a photograph on the site.41  
The Court of Appeals of Maryland then suggested three nonexhaustive ways in a 
which a party could authenticate social media evidence: (1) testimony by the 
alleged creator of the website that she actually created the page and posted the 
disputed content, (2) evidence obtained from a search of the Internet history and 
hard drive of the alleged author’s computer, and (3) information directly 
obtained from the relevant social networking website.42 
V. RAISING THE BAR 
The split of authority acknowledged by the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Parker also suggests the test that should be used for determining whether the 
authentication bar should be raised for social media evidence: If the risk of 
forgery with social media evidence is similar to the forgery risk for other 
evidence, and if the circumstantial evidence typically used to authenticate 
exhibits under Rule 901(b)(4) is similarly able to quell concerns regarding that 
risk, the authentication bar should not be raised.43 But if there is a higher forgery 
risk with social media evidence, or if the typical circumstantial evidence does not 
alleviate doubts concerning social media authorship, the authentication bar 
should be raised.44 
A. The Higher Forgery Risk Associated With Social Media Evidence 
Assume the prosecution claims that the defendant handwrote a confession 
note, while the defendant claims that the note is a forgery. How easy will it be to 
determine whether the note was forged? The Advisory Committee Note to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 901 indicates that “[t]he common law approach to 
authentication of documents has been criticized . . . as one which . . . present[s] 
only a slight obstacle to the introduction of forgeries.”45 But the Advisory 
Committee rejects that concern and notes that “significant inroads upon the 
traditional insistence on authentication and identification have been made by 
accepting as at least prima facie genuine items of the kind treated in Rule 902.”46  
Federal Rule of Evidence 902 in turn allows for the self-authentication of 
twelve types of evidence, meaning that “they require no extrinsic evidence of 
authenticity in order to be admitted.”47 The Advisory Committee Note 
accompanying Rule 902 indicates that the Rule is premised on the belief “that 
 
41.  Id. at 424.  
42.  Id. at 427–28. 
43.  Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 686–88 (Del. 2014). 
44.    See id. at 688 (noting that the Rule 104 standard is only appropriate if the trial judge 
determines that the jury has enough facts to evaluate the authenticity of the proposed evidence). 
45.  FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee note.  
46.  Id.  
47.  FED. R. EVID. 902.   
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forgery is a crime and detection is fairly easy and certain.”48 In other words, the 
authentication structure erected by the Federal Rules of Evidence is based upon 
the foundational belief that the detection of forgeries is not only easy, but 
certain. This supposition is borne out by the multitude of cases in which 
handwriting experts testify that “forgeries [a]re easy to detect.”49 These experts 
frequently use “[c]omputer-based handwriting analysis systems,” and “[t]hese 
systems have shown to be capable of detecting 100% of random and simple 
forgeries and over 90% of skilled forgeries.”50 
Conversely, it is uniquely easy to create, and difficult to detect, social media 
forgeries. On most social media websites, a user can create an account by simply 
providing a “name, home address, e-mail address, age, sex, location, and birth 
date,”51 and “[t]he fact that a user profile is entirely self-generated can lead to 
significant mischief and presents an interesting conundrum for law 
enforcement.”52 Because “fragments of information, either crafted under our 
authority or fabricated by others, are available by performing a Google 
search . . . forever,” it does not take much for anyone with Internet access to 
create a convincing fake Facebook or Twitter profile for someone he barely 
knows.53 Moreover, “[b]ecause social media is often stored on remote servers, is 
assessed through unique interfaces, can be dynamic and collaborative in nature, 
and is uniquely susceptible to alteration and fabrication, evidentiary standards 
developed for other types of electronically stored information [ESI] may not be 
adequate.”54 
In addition, it is exceptionally easy to hack into another person’s social 
media account.55 Such a feat usually consists of simply coming up with the other 
person’s password, which can be accomplished by something as simple as a guess 
or more complex methods like a password-guessing tool, social engineering, 
phishing, and spoofing.56 In the end, the proof of the ease of social media 
hacking is largely in the pudding. First, there have been a number of “hacks” of 
 
48.  FED. R. EVID. 902 advisory committee note.  
49.  E.g., Eason Publ’n, Inc. v. Nationsbank of Georgia, 458 S.E.2d 899, 901 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).   
50.  Bryan Found., Doug Rogers & Robert Schmittat, ‘Matrix Analysis’: A Technique to 
Investigate the Spatial Properties of Handwritten Images, 11 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 
51, 52–53 (1998).  
51.  Nathan Petrashek, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of Online 
Social Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1495, 1499 n.16 (2010).  
52.  Id. 
53.  David Hector Montes, Living Our Lives Online: The Privacy Implications of Online Social 
Networking, Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y, 
Spring 2009, at 508.  
54.  H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Authenticating Social Media Evidence, N.Y.L.J., 
Oct. 2, 2012, at para. 4.  
55.  Kathryn Kinnison Van Namen, Comment, Facebook Facts and Twitter Tips—Prosecutors 
and Social Media: An Analysis of the Implications Associated with the Use of Social Media in the 
Prosecution Function, 81 MISS. L.J. 549, 565 (2012). 
56.  See Michael Brittain & K. James Sullivan, 5 Principles for Minimizing the Likelihood and 
Effects of Cyber Attacks, WESTLAW J. COMPUTER & INTERNET, October 19, 2012, at 2 (2012).  
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high profile Twitter accounts in recent years.57 Second, many recent “cases in 
which romantic partners have accessed social networking accounts illustrate the 
susceptibility of social media accounts to security breaches.”58 
B. The Impracticality of Standard Rule 901(b)(4)  
Such concerns about social media forgery might be acceptable if courts 
applied an admissibility standard that substantially quelled concerns about 
authenticity. As noted, courts typically allow for the authentication of social 
media evidence under Rule 901(b)(4).59 The problem is that, as currently 
applied, 901(b)(4) is an analog rule in a digital world. 
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 901(b)(4) proffers three ways in 
which the characteristics of the offered item itself allow for authentication. 
1. Peculiar Knowledge 
First, “a document or telephone conversation may be shown to have 
emanated from a particular person by virtue of its disclosing knowledge of facts 
known peculiarly to him.”60 As support for this proposition, the Advisory 
Committee cites Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Braniff.61 
In Braniff, T.E. Braniff brought an action against the Globe Automatic 
Sprinkler Company, seeking to recover a commission he was owed for securing a 
contract for the installation of a sprinkler system.62 The lawsuit hinged on the 
authenticity of a letter the defendant allegedly wrote, offering to pay Braniff a 
ten percent commission on the installation of any sprinkler systems installed 
pursuant to contracts he assisted the defendant in procuring.63 The Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma found that the letter was properly authenticated because 
“[t]he contents of the letter related to facts peculiarly within the knowledge of 
the defendant’s agents and employees, and for the letter to have been written by 
any person other than the defendant would have been a most unusual and 
extraordinary thing to have happened.”64 
In the 21st century, however, the extraordinary has become ordinary, and 
 
57.  Julianne Pepitone, AP Hack Proves Twitter Has a Serious Cybersecurity Problem, 
CNNMONEY (April 23, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/04/23/technology/security/ap-
twitter-hacked/index.html.  
58.  Smith v. State, 136 So.3d 424, 435 (Miss. 2014); see, e.g., Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 
552 (Tex. App. 2012) (reviewing evidence relating to Facebook account access for the defendant and 
his girlfriend, the victim); Simmons v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-SC-000064-MR, 2013 WL 674721, at 
*1 (Ky. Feb. 21, 2013) (discussing law enforcement obtaining sexually suggestive messages between an 
adult and a middle-school student, because the adult’s girlfriend accessed his Facebook account when 
he ended their relationship).   
59.  See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the authentication of social media evidence using 
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4). 
60.  FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) advisory committee note.  
61.  Id. (citing Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Braniff, 214 P. 127 (Okla. 1923)). 
62.  Braniff, 214 P. at 128. 
63.  Id.  
64.  Id. at 129. 
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the notion that many facts are peculiarly in the knowledge of a single person or 
small group of people seems quaint. And yet, many courts deem social media 
postings authenticated based upon the assumption of such private knowledge.65 
In State v. Bell,66 the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio allowed for the 
authentication of MySpace messages in part because they allegedly “contain[ed] 
code words known only to defendant and his [two] alleged victims.”67 Before it 
was reversed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland found in Griffin that the “SNITCHES GET STITCHES” post was 
properly authenticated by facts peculiarly in the knowledge of Griffin’s 
girlfriend: her birthdate, the fact that she had two children with Griffin, and the 
fact that Griffin went by the name “Boozy.”68 
Additionally, as was the case for Tiffany Parker, Travis Campbell’s case 
started and ended with Facebook. On February 26, 2011, Campbell became 
angry when he saw that his friend had sent a Facebook message to his girlfriend, 
and Campbell allegedly assaulted his girlfriend the next day.69 On March 2, 
Campbell allegedly sent his girlfriend three Facebook messages, including one 
that stated, “please help me ana i cry every day i am so f—ing stuppid [sic] for 
hurthig [sic] u i am guilty what was I thinking please message me tell me your 
mind let me talk please, I am so ashame [sic].”70 The Court of Appeals of Texas, 
Austin, found that these messages were properly authenticated in part because 
“the messages reference the incident and potential charges, which at the time the 
messages were sent, few people would have known about.”71 
In order for any of these rulings to hold water, it would have to be 
extraordinary for anyone other than the alleged social media author to have the 
relevant knowledge. In Bell, this was an impossibility because neither of the 
defendant’s two alleged victims could have sent the MySpace messages; 
alternately, if either the defendant or the victims used the “code words” around 
other people or anywhere online, the knowledge would no longer have been 
known peculiarly to them.72 In Griffin, as the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
acknowledged, any number of people could have known the birth date of 
Griffin’s girlfriend, the fact that Griffin and she had two children together, and 
the fact that Griffin went by the nickname “Boozy.”73 Moreover, in Campbell, 
 
65.  See supra Part III for a discussion of cases in which an assumption of private knowledge was 
a factor in authenticating social media evidence. 
66.  882 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio C.P. 2008). 
67.  Bell, 882 N.E.2d at 68.  
68.  Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791, 806–07 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); see also Michelle Sherman, 
The Anatomy of a Trial with Social Media and the Internet, 14 J. INTERNET L. 1, 13–14 (2011) 
(discussing the court’s reasoning in Griffin). 
69.  Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. App. 2012).   
70.  Id. at 551.  
71.  Id. at 552.  
72.  See State v. Bell, 882 N.E.2d 502, 512 (Ohio C.P. 2008) (noting electronic communications 
were authenticated in part because they contained code words known only to the defendant and his 
alleged victims). 
73.  Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 423–24 (Md. 2011).  
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four days had passed between the assault and the Facebook messages.74 Four 
days is more than enough time for a number of people to learn about the attack, 
especially given that Campbell, his girlfriend, and his friend all had Facebook 
accounts.  
All of these cases reinforce the reality that we live in a brave new digital 
world in which “almost nothing is private.”75 Moreover, once information is 
posted online, the word “almost” can be removed from the previous sentence.76 
Thus, it seems appropriate to raise the bar on exactly what type of “peculiar 
knowledge” that allows for an inference of authentication under Rule 901(b)(4). 
For instance, in State v. Eleck,77 Simone Judway testified as a witness for the 
prosecution that Robert Eleck told her “if anyone messes with me tonight, I am 
going to stab them” soon before he allegedly stabbed the victim.78 On cross-
examination, Judway claimed that she had not spoken to Eleck in person, by 
telephone, or by computer since the incident, prompting the defense to seek to 
impeach her through Facebook messages allegedly exchanged between Eleck 
and Judway after the incident.79 One such exchange addressed the prior 
acrimonious relationship between the two: 
Simone Danielle: Hey I saw you the other day and I just want to say 
nice bike. 
[The Defendant]: why would you wanna talk to me 
Simone Danielle: I’m just saying that you have a nice bike that’s all. 
The past is the past.80 
The “Simone Danielle” Facebook account indisputably belonged to 
Judway, but Judway claimed that the account was hacked, and the Connecticut 
Appellate Court found that the messages could not be authenticated, thus 
indicating that Eleck failed to satisfy the peculiar knowledge standard.81 
Specifically, the court was 
not convinced that the content of this exchange provided distinctive 
evidence of the interpersonal conflict between the defendant and 
Judway. To the contrary, this exchange could have been generated by 
any person using Judway’s account as it does not reflect distinct 
information that only Judway would have possessed regarding the 
 
74.  Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 553. 
75.  Charles E. MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Doctrine is Rudderless in the Digital Age, Unless Congress Continually Resets the Privacy Bar, 24 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 47, 58 (2014). 
76.  Sarah L. Gottfried, Note, Virtual Visitation: The New Wave of Communication Between 
Children and Non-Custodial Parents in Relocation Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 567, 592 (2003) 
(“[N]othing is private over the Internet”). 
77.  23 A.3d 818 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). 
78.  Eleck, 23 A.3d at 820.  
79.  Id.  
80.  Id. at 820 n.2.  
81.  See id. at 824 (stating that “this exchange could have been generated by any person using 
Judway’s account as it does not reflect distinct information that only Judway would have possessed 
regarding the defendant or the character of their relationship”). 
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defendant or the character of their relationship. In other cases in which 
a message has been held to be authenticated by its content, the 
identifying characteristics have been much more distinctive of the 
purported author and often have been corroborated by other events or 
with forensic computer evidence.82 
Eleck reflects the reality of modern communications and the fact that peculiar 
knowledge is truly peculiar in the social media realm. Accordingly, courts should 
rely on something more than broad biographical data or the fact that “mere 
days” have passed since a crime to conclude that such facts are peculiarly within 
the knowledge of the alleged author of a social media post. 
2. “Reply Letter” Doctrine 
Second, the Note to Rule 901(b)(4) indicates that “a letter may be 
authenticated by content and circumstances indicating it was in reply to a duly 
authenticated one.”83 In order for this “reply letter” doctrine to apply, the 
proponent must “prove that the first letter was dated, was duly mailed at a given 
time and place, and was addressed to [the sender of the reply-letter].”84 Thus, in 
National Paralegal Institute Coalition v. Commissioner,85 the government was 
able to authenticate a “reply letter” written by the petitioner by establishing that 
it was a response to a dated letter sent to the petitioner’s address.86 
In some cases involving the authentication of social media evidence, 
however, courts have tried to extend this reply letter doctrine to a new 
medium—the social medium —that is less hospitable to this type of 
authentication. For instance, in Parker, the Delaware Supreme Court primarily 
found that Tiffany Parker’s Facebook posts were authenticated because the 
victim viewed Parker’s post through a mutual friend and shared the post by 
publishing it on her own Facebook page.87 Meanwhile, in Smith, the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi found that the prosecution had not properly authenticated 
Facebook messages only after disagreeing with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion 
that the defendant’s messages were replies to his girlfriend’s Facebook 
message.88 
These cases illustrate at least two problems with applying a liberal version 
of the “reply letter” doctrine to social media evidence. Under the traditional 
“reply letter” doctrine, a reply is authenticated in two ways by reference to an 
original letter: (1) the original letter was sent to the alleged author’s house, and 
(2) the “reply letter” replies to the content of the original letter.89 In these cases, 
 
82.  Id.  
83.  FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) advisory committee note.  
84.  2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 224 at 95 (7th ed. 2013). 
85.  90 T.C.M. (CCH) 623 (T.C. 2005).   
86.  Nat’l Paralegal Inst., 90 T.C.M. (CCH) at 625.  
87.  Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 688 (Del. 2014). 
88.  Smith v. State, 136 So.3d 424, 435 (Miss. 2014) (“[I]t does not appear that Smith’s messages 
are replying to anything in Waldrop’s message.”).  
89.  See BROUN ET AL., supra note 84, § 224 at 94–95 (discussing the method of authentication 
under the “reply letter” doctrine). 
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the fact that the original letter was sent to the alleged author’s house can be 
proven through a deed, mortgage, or rental agreement, and authenticity is 
established through the unlikelihood that someone else intercepted the original 
letter and forged a response.90 
Conversely, because social media websites do not have similar property 
records, and because such sites are created from user-generated data that can be 
culled from quick Internet searches, courts in cases like Parker and Smith are 
using the content of posts to establish ownership. In Parker, there was nothing 
tying Tiffany Parker to the disputed Facebook page besides her picture and the 
name “Tiffanni Parker.”91 And in Smith, the girlfriend “did not testify as to how 
she knew that the Facebook account was Smith’s, nor did she testify as to how 
she knew that Smith actually authored the Facebook messages.”92 
Courts such as the Parker court also seem to fail to grasp the way that social 
media websites work in applying the “reply letter” doctrine. For a reply to a 
snail-mail letter to come from someone other than the addressee, the imposter 
would have to burglarize the post office or pilfer the letter from the addressee’s 
mailbox. On the other hand, Facebook messages can be copied or re-shared by 
anyone who can see them, which is usually anyone with a Facebook account, 
even if the user attempts to keep the information private.93 Therefore, the fact 
that the victim in Parker saw the Facebook messages on her friend’s page and 
shared them on her own page says nothing more than that the victim thought 
Parker’s Facebook page was authentic. 
One of the few courts to recognize the problems with applying a liberal 
version of the “reply letter” doctrine to social media evidence was the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Purdy.94 In Purdy, the 
court noted the existence of the “reply letter” doctrine but found that evidence 
“that the electronic communication originates from . . . a social networking Web 
site such as Facebook or MySpace that bears the defendant’s name is not 
sufficient alone to authenticate the electronic communication as having been 
authored or sent by the defendant.”95 That said, the court ultimately found 
authentication of the messages at issue based upon other evidence such as data 
recovered from the hard drive of the defendant’s computer.96 In Eleck, the 
Appellate Court of Connecticut applied similar reasoning but found that the 
reply letter doctrine could not be used to authenticate Facebook messages 
 
90.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brooks, 508 A.2d 316, 319–320 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (noting that 
a writing can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence that may take a number of forms, including 
evidence of events preceding or following the execution of the delivery of the writing).  
91.  Parker, 85 A.3d at 684.  
92.  Smith, 136 So.3d at 434.  
93.    Kathryn R. Brown, Note, The Risks of Taking Facebook at Face Value: Why the Psychology 
of Social Networking Should Influence the Evidentiary Relevance of Facebook Photographs 14 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 357, 363 n.33 (2012) (citing Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy).  
94.    945 N.E.2d 372 (Mass. 2011).  
95.    Purdy, 945 N.E.2d at 381 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162 (2010)). 
96.  Id.  
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because “there was a lack of circumstantial evidence to verify the identity of the 
person with whom the defendant was messaging.”97 
Given the difference between a house and a website, courts should apply 
something approximating the more rigorous analysis utilized by the courts in 
Purdy and Eleck. It should not be enough that the alleged author replied to a 
social media post; instead, courts should require additional evidence that links 
the alleged author to the message. 
3. Language Patterns 
Third, the Note to Rule 901(b)(4) states that “[l]anguage patterns may 
indicate authenticity or its opposite.”98 As support for this proposition, the 
Committee cites Magnuson v. State,99 a case in which a Swedish native was 
charged with the bombing death of a victim in Marshfield, Wisconsin.100 The 
wrapper on the bomb was preserved, and, on it, “[t]he word ‘Marshfield’ was 
misspelled, being written ‘Marsfilld,’ the ‘h’ and ‘e’ being omitted.”101 The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that at trial the bomb wrapper was 
authenticated as written by the defendant because (1) a professor “testified that 
this spelling was characteristic of one familiar with the Swedish language as was 
also the pronunciation ‘Mars’ for ‘Marsh,’” and (2) the defendant was the only 
person with known enmity against the victim and “the only person of Swedish 
nationality in the district.”102 Because the bomb was sent locally in a package in 
the mail, the court concluded that it was likely the defendant who sent it.103  
Many courts today use similar analysis to authenticate social media 
evidence. In Campbell, the court found the defendant’s Facebook messages were 
authenticated in large part because “the unique speech pattern presented in the 
messages [wa]s consistent with the speech pattern that Campbell, a native of 
Jamaica, used in testifying at trial.”104 Meanwhile, in Tienda, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals used the appellant’s alleged three MySpace pages as “ample 
circumstantial evidence—taken as a whole with all of the individual, particular 
details considered in combination—to support a finding that the MySpace pages 
belonged to the appellant and that he created and maintained them.”105 
Again, there are at least a few problems with applying this analysis to social 
media evidence. First, in Magnuson, the defendant could be singled out as the 
bomb’s sender because he was the only person of Swedish nationality in the 
subject community.106 Conversely, in a case like Campbell, the relevant 
 
97.  State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 825 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).  
98.  FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) advisory committee note.  
99.     203 N.W. 749 (Wis. 1925). 
100.   Magnuson, 203 N.W. at 750. 
101. Id.  
102. Id.  
103. See id. at 750. 
104. Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 551–52 (Tex. App. 2012).  
105.  Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).  
106.  Magnuson, 203 N.W. at 750. 
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community is the online community, where there are millions of people of 
Jamaican nationality. This issue, of course, could partially be remedied by two of 
the solutions proposed in Griffin: obtaining data from the alleged author’s hard 
drive or the social media website.107 
Second, anyone with Internet access can view every tweet that a person has 
tweeted and most content that a Facebook user has posted, making a “pattern” 
analysis more problematic.108 Indeed, “social media websites are designed to 
share information with others,” and even information that a user intends to keep 
private is almost always publicly accessible.109 
In 1925, the Magnuson court could conclude that it was unlikely that 
somebody else mimicked the way that a person of Swedish decent might 
communicate; in Campbell, anyone with Internet access could have viewed 
Campbell’s Facebook content and created similar-looking content if they had 
access to his account. Indeed, Campbell’s girlfriend admitted at trial that she 
once had access to Campbell’s Facebook account, although she claimed that he 
changed his password before he assaulted her.110 
Similarly, the defendant in Tienda might in fact have created three separate 
MySpace pages; alternately, a “malefactor” could have viewed all of the content 
on the defendant’s legitimate MySpace page and created a fake page, or pages, 
similar to the genuine article in form and substance. Appreciating these 
concerns, the court in Eleck refused to find authentication of a Facebook page 
where there was evidence of a subsequent hacking of the page because the 
hacking “highlight[ed] the general lack of security of the medium and raise[d] an 
issue as to whether a third party may have sent the messages.”111 
Eleck should not be read for the proposition that a pattern analysis can 
never be used to authenticate particular social media content given the lack of 
security of the format. But, if a case features evidence of prior or subsequent 
hacking, multiple accounts on the same platform, or access by an interested third 
party, the proponent should have to present evidence of something beyond 
consistency among posts or the ethnic background of the alleged author. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Courts are increasingly at a crossroads with regard to the authentication of 
social media evidence. Most courts cling to the belief that the risk of social media 
forgery is no different that the forgery risk with other types of evidence and 
continue to apply an authentication standard put in place when the “written 
word” was still primarily written. A few courts, however, are beginning to 
recognize that Rule 901(b)(4) is an analog rule in a digital world that must be 
 
107.  Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 427–28 (Md. 2011). 
108.  Brian M. Molinari, When Online Behavior Becomes a Real-World Problem, 16 N.Y. EMP. 
L. LETTER, no. 9, 2009, at 1.   
109.  Agnieszka A. Mcpeak, The Facebook Digital Footprint: Paving Fair and Consistent 
Pathways to Civil Discovery of Social Media Data, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 928–29 (2013).  
110.  Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 551.  
111.  State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 824 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).  
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ratcheted up to address an online world where nothing is private and a 
medium—the social medium—where user profiles are self-generated and highly 
susceptible to hacking. This essay is a first attempt to address how to raise the 
bar on the authentication of social media evidence. 
 
